

### Assignment 1

(Due: Tuesday, October 6 – Drop Box by 4pm)

1. Each period a generation with size  $N_t$  is born, where the population grows (shrinks) at a constant rate  $n > 1$  ( $n < 1$ ). All generations have an endowment of  $y$  of the single consumption good when young and no endowment when old. Preferences for each generation  $t$  are given by

$$u(c_t(t), c_t(t+1)) = \sqrt{c_t(t)} + \sqrt{c_t(t+1)},$$

with preferences for the initial old given by  $u(c_{-1}(0)) = \sqrt{c_{-1}(0)}$ .

- (a) Derive the set of feasible allocations for this economy in terms of the population growth rate  $n$ . Draw a diagram properly labelled showing the feasible set.

Set now  $n = 2$ , i.e. the population doubles each generation.

- (b) Show that the stationary allocation  $(c_1, c_2) = (\frac{3}{4}y, \frac{1}{2}y)$  is **not** Pareto optimal. [Hint: Find a feasible allocation that pareto-dominates this allocation.]
- (c) Let  $n = 2$  and set  $y = 1$ . Find **all** stationary Pareto optimal allocations for this economy.
- (d) Find a stationary transfer scheme  $(\tau_1, \tau_2)$  that achieves the best allocation for all generations except the initial old.

Suppose now that the young have access to a storage technology that yields a gross return  $r > 0$ ; i.e., if 1 unit of the good is invested today, it yields  $r$  units tomorrow.

- (e) In the absence of transfers, find the optimal storage of resources by each generation. For which values of  $r$  do all generations except the initial old prefer storage over the transfer scheme that you have found in part (d)?
- (f) Suppose the transfer scheme lasts only for  $T$  periods. How does your answer to part (e) change, if this is publicly announced? What if no one anticipates that the scheme ends at  $T$ ? Explain your answer.

2. Suppose the population size is constant over time and normalized to 1, i.e.  $N_t = 1$  for all  $t$ . The initial old have an endowment of  $M$  units of money. All members of the other generations have an endowment of  $y$  of the single consumption good when young and no endowment when old. Preferences for each generation  $t$  are given by

$$u(c_t(t), c_t(t+1)) = \ln c_t(t) + \beta \ln c_t(t+1),$$

with preferences for the initial old given by  $u(c_{-1}(0)) = \ln c_{-1}(0)$  and  $\beta \in (0, 1]$ .

- (a) Define a stationary (monetary) equilibrium with perfect foresight.
- (b) Derive the savings function (or real balances)  $\frac{m_t}{p_t}$  in terms of  $y$  and  $\beta$  for a stationary equilibrium.
- (c) Find the stationary equilibrium.
- (d) Suppose now that the endowment of money for the initial old doubles to  $2M$ . What are the effects on equilibrium prices and equilibrium allocations? Interpret your results.

3. Suppose the population stays constant at  $N_t = 2$  for all  $t$  and the initial old generation has a total endowment of  $M$  units of money. All other generations have a total endowment of  $Y$  of the single consumption good when young and no endowment when old. Preferences for each generation  $t$  are given by

$$u(c_t(t), c_t(t+1)) = \sqrt{c_t(t)} + \beta\sqrt{c_t(t+1)},$$

with preferences for the initial old given by  $u(c_{-1}(0)) = \sqrt{c_{-1}(0)}$  and  $\beta \in (0, 1]$ .

- (a) What are the individual endowments of  $m_{-1}$  for the old generation and  $y$  for the young generation?
- (b) Find a stationary equilibrium with perfect foresight.

Suppose now that people in generation  $t$  expect the price level to change by  $(a - 1)$  in the next period; i.e.,  $p_{t+1}^e = ap_t$  for all  $t$ , where  $a \in (0, \infty)$ .

- (c) Find generation  $t$ 's consumption plan  $(c_t(t), c_t^e(t+1))$  as a function of prices  $p_t$  and expected prices  $p_{t+1}^e$ . [Hint: Use the MRS and the budget constraint given  $p_{t+1}^e$ .]
- (d) Find generation  $t$ 's consumption when old in terms of prices  $p_{t+1}$ .
- (e) Find the temporary equilibrium. [Hint: Use market clearing in period  $t$  to solve for  $p_t$ .]
- (f) Compare consumption, the savings function and welfare in the temporary and perfect foresight equilibrium for the cases  $a = 1$ ,  $a > 1$  and  $a < 1$ . Interpret your results by looking at the differences in expectations about future prices.