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Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination when Countries Differ in Size

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JEUX SANS FRONTIÈRES: TAX COMPETITION AND TAX COORDINATION WHEN COUNTRIES DIFFER IN SIZE

by

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Abstract: Closer international integration is putting increasing pressure on existing national tax structures. This paper uses a simple two-country model to address a range of policy concerns that consequently arise, focussing particularly on the role of national size. Differences in size exacerbate the inefficiency due to non-cooperative behaviour, harming both countries. The smaller country would lose from harmonization to any tax rate between those of the non-cooperative equilibrium, but both countries would gain from the imposition of a minimum tax anywhere in that range. The fully optimal response to freer cross-border trade, however, may be to do absolutely nothing.

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1. Introduction

Which kinds of countries choose to become tax havens? What is the likely pattern of taxation in a border-free "Europe 1992" if there is no central coordination of tax rates? Are there simple forms of coordination from which all Member States could expect to benefit? Is harmonization\(^1\) desirable? Would the US be wise to insist on a minimum tax requirement on key economic activities in moving to free trade with Mexico? Or is it Mexico that should seek such a condition? If two countries make it easier for goods to move between them, how should they adjust their domestic tax structures?

These and other policy questions reflect the increasing strain that the internationalisation of economic activity is placing on national tax structures designed for a less integrated world. For free international movement of goods and capital means, in large part, free international movement of tax bases. The pressures that this creates are most evident in the European Community (EC), where the intended removal of all controls on movement between Member States - a central component of the 1992 programme - jeopardises their ability to enforce what are currently widely divergent tax structures. But similar problems arise in other parts of the world, and indeed seem set to become increasingly pressing. The indirect tax differentials exposed by the free trade agreement between the US and Canada, for instance, appear to have generated considerable tax-induced cross-border trade.\(^2\) Free trade with Mexico seems likely to lead to even more severe problems. Nor are these concerns only for developed economies. How should Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire set their producer taxes on cocoa, for instance, given producers' ability to smuggle their output across the border between them?

The purpose of this paper is to develop a model that is rich enough to

\(^1\)The term 'harmonisation' has come to be interpreted in a number of ways. We mean by it convergence of tax rates across jurisdictions towards some average of their initial values. This purely descriptive sense is the one which closest matches traditional usage in the policy debate in Europe.

\(^2\)This is casual empiricism: only anecdotal evidence currently seems available. See Gordon (1990) for a broader assessment of the tax issues raised by free trade between the US and Canada.
capture some of the central features of the interaction between national tax systems in an integrated world but simple enough to yield sharp insights into some of the central questions - including those above - which that interaction raises.

The underlying general theme is the comparison between tax competition and tax cooperation. This is also a concern within federal tax structures, and has received considerable attention in the fiscal federalism literature. Gordon (1983), in particular, provides a general analysis of both non-cooperative and cooperative tax setting within a federal structure consisting of two levels of government (non-cooperative here meaning that each lower-level jurisdiction sets the taxes at its disposal to maximise the welfare only of its own residents, cooperative that all taxes are chosen to maximise some social welfare function defined over all nationals). There are indeed strong analytical similarities between the federal and international problems: many of the problems that the European Community currently faces are ones that federal states have lived with for decades. Lived with, but perhaps not resolved. In the US, for instance, interstate bootlegging of cigarettes has long been a serious concern. More recently mail order sales have also emerged as a sizeable (and growing) problem. And even a revenue loss of zero, it should be stressed, is consistent with the existence of a substantial policy problem, since it could reflect spontaneous harmonization through inefficient interstate tax competition. While our analysis may thus have a bearing on problems of fiscal federalism,

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3 Aspects of non-cooperative tax setting in a federal context are also examined by, for instance, Arnott and Grieson (1981) and Wilson (1986).

4 The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1977) estimated that in ten states the revenue foregone through smuggling was over 15% of cigarette tax receipts, while four or five other states were substantial gainers: New Hampshire, for example, was estimated to receive nearly 50% of its cigarette tax revenue from sales to bootleggers. The report also documents the heavy involvement of organised crime; in one tax official's view "smuggling cigarettes is the next most profitable enterprise for the mob...to narcotics[,] more lucrative than numbers and prostitution" (p.112). More recently, Becker, Grossman and Murphy (1990) repeatedly find that tax incentives to smuggle have a statistically significant effect on state cigarette sales. See also Fox (1986) and the references therein for further evidence on tax-related interstate shopping in the US.

5 Duncan (1989) puts the revenue loss on untaxed interstate mail orders at a sizeable $2.5 billion per annum.
the absence of an over-arching sovereign authority with considerable revenue-raising powers of its own means that the practical policy options in the international context with which we are principally concerned are very different from - and more limited than - those available in the federal setting. Closer to the present analysis both in its concerns and still more in the explicit game-theoretic approach it adopts is the work of Mintz and Tulkens (1986), extended by de Crombrugghe and Tulkens (1990). This examines non-cooperative and cooperative commodity tax setting in a general equilibrium model of two countries trading in two goods, costly transport between the two preventing complete equalisation of tax-inclusive goods prices.

A hallmark of much previous work on tax competition has been its generality: Gordon (1983) and Mintz and Tulkens (1986), for instance, place no or few restrictions on the structure of consumer preferences. This has the advantage of uncovering as fully as possible the qualitative inefficiencies liable to arise from uncoordinated tax-setting. But generality in this area is not without cost. In the model of Mintz and Tulkens (1986), for instance, intrinsic discontinuities in the two countries' best response curves mean that a non-cooperative equilibrium in pure strategies cannot in general be shown to exist. Even if one does, few general characterization results are available; and any kind of comparative statics, such as an examination of the welfare effects of harmonizing taxes to some common level, rapidly becomes intractable. While one cannot hope for any perfectly general conclusions on such matters, one can hope for more sharply focussed insights into the central issues. For this one must look to simpler models, and that is the approach adopted here. By reducing the problem to a few key components we are able, for instance, not only to prove the existence of a unique non-cooperative equilibrium but to derive closed forms for the associated tax rates. Comparative static analysis, both local and discrete, proves to be relatively straightforward.

Our model is also designed to focus on a consideration which casual empiricism suggests to be of considerable significance in shaping international tax relations: the relative sizes of the economies involved. Switzerland and the Isle of Man are not large countries. Particularly important in the EC context is Luxembourg, notable for its relatively light
taxation of both goods and capital income. Indeed the particular problems that Luxembourg perceives in aligning its tax structure more closely with those of other Member States are a central concern in evaluating coordination proposals for the EC, since fiscal measures - unlike almost all others - still require unanimity amongst Member States. Surprisingly enough, the role of size in strategic tax design seems previously to have received no explicit attention. Here it will be a primary concern. It will be seen, for instance, that disparity in size is a source of inefficiency in itself, exacerbating the loss that each country suffers as a consequence of non-cooperative behaviour.

Section 2 describes our model. This is cast in the literally spatial terms of cross-border shopping induced by tax differentials on some consumption good, but can be interpreted much more generally. Cross-border shopping - broadly interpreted to include purchases for resale - is indeed the central concern behind the indirect tax proposals in the EC. It is already a serious problem in much of Europe: not only in countries bordering Luxembourg but also, for example, between Eire and North Ireland. One other feature of the model should be emphasised. We assume governments to be Leviathans: the objective of each is to maximise its tax revenue. The analysis can thus be viewed in either of two ways: as providing a public choice perspective on strategic aspects of tax-setting in an international context (our results then being thought of as positive rather than normative), or - our preferred interpretation - as a conventional welfarist treatment of such issues for the case in which consumers place a very high marginal valuation on some public good which tax revenue goes to finance.

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6 Assuming that purchases by non-residents are eliminated, van Leeuwen and Tang (1991) estimate, for instance, that the European Commission's 1987 proposals (see footnote 10) would reduce Luxembourg's value-added tax (VAT) revenues by up to 16%. Potentially even more important is the effect on revenue from excises (cigarettes, alcohol and petrol), which are marked by still wider international tax differentials.

7 Its potential importance has often been recognised informally, as for example in Gordon (1990).


9 FitzGerald (1989) estimates, for example, that in 1986 about 25 per cent of all spirits drunk in the Republic of Ireland were purchased in Northern Ireland.
Sections 3 and 4 characterise and investigate the outcome under unrestricted tax competition, modelled as a non-cooperative (Nash) equilibrium in tax-setting. Partial measures of tax coordination are then examined in Section 5. The central policy options here have been clearly raised by the current debate in Europe. One, advocated most forcefully by the British government, is to leave tax competition unfettered. This corresponds to our non-cooperative equilibrium, which we then take as a benchmark in evaluating two forms of coordination that have been widely canvassed. The first is the harmonization of tax rates at some common level, as proposed by the European Commission in its original 1992 programme. The second, and that currently favoured by the Commission (at least for a period of transition), is the imposition of a minimum tax rate. We establish a clear ranking between these strategies. Neither, however, is likely to be fully optimal as a response to the problems associated with the opening of borders. Section 6 therefore characterises the jointly optimal tax structure in such a setting. It emerges, for instance, that the wisest response to these problems may be to entirely ignore them. Section 7 concludes.

2. Taxes and cross-border trade

The model is a partial equilibrium one of two countries and a single taxed good. The two countries, ‘home’ and ‘foreign’, lie on the interval [-1,1] with a border between them at the origin: see Figure 1 (at the end of the paper). Within each country the population is distributed uniformly. The sizes of the two populations, however, may differ: adopting the convention that lower case letters refer to the home country and upper case to the foreign, there are h individuals in the home country and H in the foreign. We refer to \( \theta = \frac{h}{H} \) as a measure of the relative size of the home country, and say that h is ‘small,’ if \( \theta < 1 \).

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10 Strictly, the Commission has argued not for full harmonization at a single common rate but for ‘approximation’ within a common band (Commission, 1985). In its 1987 proposals, the standard rate of VAT, for example, was to lie between 14 and 20 per cent (Commission, 1987).


12 There are other ways of characterising differences in size; that used here is merely the simplest. It would be more accurate, but would become
Taxes are levied on the destination basis, in the sense that each store must charge the tax rate of the jurisdiction in which it is located. Enforcement of the destination principle is imperfect, however, in that there are no border tax adjustments on purchases made in either country by residents of the other. This may reflect either illegal concealment of trade or - as intended by the European Commission from 1993 - unlimited allowances for duty-paid goods intended for personal use.\(^\text{13}\)

Supply and demand are modelled as simply as possible. For the former, there are assumed to be no barriers to the entry or exit of new stores, and no fixed costs once established. In effect, each consumer thus lives above a store at which she can purchase the good at its tax-inclusive marginal cost. As will be seen, the distribution of stores may well be far from uniform in equilibrium: there may be a desert one side of the border and a vast mall just over it. But stores merely respond passively to tax-induced cross-border shopping; they do not attempt to manipulate it.\(^\text{14}\)

On the demand side, each consumer buys one unit of the commodity if its cost to her is less than or equal to her reservation price, otherwise she buys none. Consumers' reservation prices are identical within each country but may differ between them: that of home consumers is \(v\); that of foreign consumers is \(V\). We assume the producer price of the commodity to be both constant and the same in both countries: defining the reservation prices net of this producer price, the consumer price charged at any store can be taken to be exactly the tax imposed in that jurisdiction. These taxes (in per unit form) are denoted by \(t\) and \(T\).

Consider then the decision problem of a consumer in the home country. She

\(^{13}\) There are various exclusions, including mail order purchases.

\(^{14}\) See Braid (1987) for an analysis of price responses to spatially differentiated taxes in a model with imperfectly competitive stores.

\(^{15}\) The assumption of uniform taxation within jurisdictions is restrictive: differential taxation will generally dominate in the open border setting considered below. And such differentiation is indeed sometimes observed: sales taxes are lower, for example, in counties of Washington that border Oregon, in which there is no sales tax. We leave this extension, however, for further analysis.
can either purchase the commodity in her own country, where it is available to her at her doorstep at price $t$, or travel to (just over) the border and purchase it in the foreign country at price $T$. Travelling to the border (and back) entails a cost of $\delta > 0$ per unit distance from the frontier.\textsuperscript{16} This is most naturally interpreted as reflecting literal transportation costs (including leisure foregone), but the structure might also be interpreted for instance, in terms of a distribution of transactions costs in establishing price differentials.

Suppose that our consumer is located at a distance $s$ from the border. Then she will buy in the foreign country if and only if two conditions are satisfied. The first is that the surplus she enjoys by doing so exceed that from buying at the store downstairs. This requires

$$v - T - \delta s > v - t$$

or equivalently

$$\frac{(t - T)}{\delta} > s .$$

(2.1)

The second is that this surplus be non-negative:

$$v - T - \delta s \geq 0 .$$

(2.2)

Figure 1 illustrates for the case in which and $v > t > T$. All residents of the home country living further than $(t-T)/\delta$ from the border will shop at home, while the rest will shop in the foreign country; we refer to the latter as cross-shoppers. Assuming that $V \geq T$, all foreign consumers will purchase in their own country.

Appropriately reinterpreted, this structure can be applied to a variety of international tax problems. For the Ghana-Côte d'Ivoire problem mentioned in the Introduction, for instance, the consumers become producers, the taxes become levies on production and the reservation values become the world price of cocoa. Or one might think of multinationals having some discretion over the jurisdiction in which their profits are taxed (through their location decisions or by transfer pricing between affiliates), but differing

\textsuperscript{16} There is some direct evidence on the private costs of cross-border shopping. Survey data for the Irish Republic, for instance, suggest a cost of about IRL0.42 (1986 prices) per mile travelled (FitzGerald, 1989).
in the costliness of the required restructuring of their activities.\textsuperscript{17} For brevity, however, the discussion will be cast only in terms of cross-border shopping.

As emphasised above, the objective of each government is taken to be the maximisation of its tax revenue; all subsequent references to optimality and Pareto efficiency are to be interpreted in that sense.\textsuperscript{18} When the border between them is closed – more precisely, when the destination principle is rigidly enforced – the two governments can entirely ignore each other in setting their tax rates: there can be no tax-induced cross border shopping,

\textsuperscript{17} The model may also be applicable to problems other than those of taxation: see for instance Burdett (1990).

\textsuperscript{18} One further aspect of this deserves elaboration. The tax competition literature has emphasised two externalities that one country imposes on another when it raises its tax rate in the presence of cross-border shopping. The first is beneficial: the effect on cross-border shopping increases the tax base of the country whose tax is unchanged. Mintz and Tuikens (1986) call this the ‘public consumption effect’. The second, emphasised by Lockwood (1990) is harmful. Non-residents who shop in the country whose tax is increased lose welfare; the ‘private consumption effect.’ By taking revenue as our criterion we ignore the latter. In the policy context with which we are concerned, however, there is an important limitation on the operation of the private consumption effect. The key distinction here is that between an origin-based system of commodity taxation and an imperfectly enforced destination basis. Under the former – which has generally been assumed in the literature – goods are taxed according to where they are produced. Under the destination basis – the norm for international taxation under GATT rules – goods are taxed according to the place of consumption. The concern in removing border controls while retaining, formally, the destination principle (as is planned in the EC, at least for the medium term) is that residents of one Member State may be able to escape its taxes by buying duty-paid in another. But they will only do so if the foreign tax rate is sufficiently low; they cannot be made to pay a foreign tax in excess of their own since appeal to the destination principle enables them to pay at the domestic rate rather than the foreign. This asymmetry means that despite their apparent similarity – in particular, arbitrage conditions relating goods prices across countries will be the same in the two cases (ignoring transport costs) – an origin basis and an imperfect destination basis imply very different incentives for strategic tax-setting. If Italy, say, had a monopoly in olive oil then under the origin basis she would have an incentive, for familiar terms of trade reasons, to tax it heavily. Under an imperfect destination basis, however, she would be unable to enforce this tax on foreigners: they would simply reclaim it and pay their domestic tax instead. With the retention of a formal destination principle the scope for such tax exporting is considerably reduced, and the likely importance of the private consumption effect consequently diminished. Removing it altogether is crude, but serves to focus on what seem to be more central policy issues.
and the assumption of a constant producer price precludes any indirect interaction through terms of trade effects. The nature of the 'closed border optimum' is then immediate: each government will extract all the surplus of its own citizens by setting its tax at the level of their reservation prices: that is,

\[ t^*_c = v ; \quad T^*_c = V \quad (2.3) \]

where the star indicates optimality and the subscript \( c \) the closed border. When the border is uncontrolled, however, we have a very different situation, to which we now turn.

3. Tax competition

Here we examine the outcome when the border is open and tax competition between the two countries is unrestricted. More precisely, we characterise and investigate the non-cooperative outcome when each government behaves in the Nash manner, choosing its own tax rate to maximise its tax revenue while taking as given the tax rate set by the other and bearing in mind the impact on cross-border shopping.

The first task is to derive the best response functions\(^{19}\) of the two governments. This we do from the perspective of the home country, the analysis for the foreign country being analogous. Thus we ask: Given \( T \), what \( t \) maximises the home country's tax revenue?

We start by assuming that

\[ v, V = +\infty, \quad (3.1) \]

so that reservation prices do not constrain governments in their tax-setting. This assumption - which is not logically coherent if there is some upper bound on consumers' expenditure - is for convenience only; having exploited the simplicity it allows, we return below to the more interesting case in which \( v \) and \( V \) are finite. Given (3.1), the revenue of the home country is readily seen to be

\(^{19}\) To be precise we should (and occasionally will) speak of correspondences.
\[ r(t, T) = \begin{cases} 
    t h \left( 1 - \left( \frac{t - T}{\delta} \right) \right) & ; \quad t \geq T \\
    t h + t H \left( \frac{T - t}{\delta} \right) & ; \quad t \leq T. 
\end{cases} \tag{3.2a} \]

Suppose for instance that \( t \leq T \). Then all \( h \) home citizens shop at home, giving revenue of \( t h \); hence the first term in (3.2b). In addition, a fraction \( (T - t)/\delta \) of the \( H \) citizens of the foreign country will cross-shop, each of them bringing \( t \) to the home government; hence the second term.

It emerges from the maximisation of (3.2) that the form of the home country's best response function depends critically on its relative size. It is shown in the Appendix that if the home country is the smaller of the two \( (\theta \leq 1) \) then

\[ t(T) = \begin{cases} 
    \frac{1}{2} (\delta + T) & ; \quad T \leq \delta \theta \\
    \frac{1}{2} (\delta \theta + T) & ; \quad T \geq \delta \theta 
\end{cases} \tag{3.3} \]

while if it is the larger \( (\theta \geq 1) \)

\[ t(T) = \begin{cases} 
    \frac{1}{2} (\delta + T) & ; \quad T \leq \delta \\
    T & ; \quad \delta \leq T \leq \delta \theta \\
    \frac{1}{2} (\delta \theta + T) & ; \quad T \geq \delta \theta 
\end{cases} \tag{3.4} \]

There is thus a fundamental asymmetry between the responses of the small country and the large. Consider the case in which the home country is small, so that its best responses are as in (3.3); this is illustrated in panel (a) of Figure 2. At very low levels of \( T \), it is optimal for the home country to set its tax above the foreign: some home citizens are lost to the foreign market, but the foreign tax rate is so low that it is not worth reducing the domestic tax rate to a level that would keep them at home. As \( T \) increases it is at first optimal for the home country to increase its tax too. Since, from (2.1), the extent of cross-border shopping depends only on the absolute difference \( t - T \), it would be possible to increase revenue by raising the home tax rate one-for-one with the foreign. It is even better,

\[ ^{20} \text{For brevity, we ignore here the upper bound of unity on the proportion of cross-shoppers: Lemma 3 of the Appendix implies that this will not bite at a non-cooperative equilibrium.} \]
however, to reduce cross-border shopping by increasing the tax rate less rapidly; indeed (3.3) shows that it is optimal to raise the home tax rate by exactly half the increase in the foreign tax rate. As $T$ continues to increase, however, it eventually becomes sufficiently high that the home country can now increase its revenue by a discontinuous tax reduction to under-cut $T$.\textsuperscript{21} When the home country is the larger of the two - the $\theta > 1$ case shown in panel (b) - its revenue-maximising tax rate always increases with the foreign country's tax rate.\textsuperscript{22} In this case there is never a gain to be had by a dramatic shift to undercutting: given its smallness, the switch in numbers from the foreign market is not enough to make this the optimal policy.

To investigate the Nash equilibrium we now assume, without loss of generality, that $\theta \leq 1$: if the two countries differ in size, it is the home that is smaller (a convention we maintain until Section 6). The home country's best response function is thus as in (3.3). The foreign country then being the larger, its best response is found by analogy with (3.4) to be:

$$
T(t) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{1}{2}(\delta + t) & ; t \leq \delta \\
\delta t + t & ; \delta \leq t \leq \delta/\theta \\
\frac{1}{2}(\delta/\theta + t) & ; t \geq \delta/\theta.
\end{cases} \tag{3.5}
$$

This is just the reflection around the $45^\circ$ line of the best response function in Panel (b) of Figure 2.

Combining the best response functions, as in Figure 3, the discontinuity in that of the small country makes the existence of a Nash equilibrium problematic. Thus it is striking to find:

\begin{proposition}
Assuming $\nu = \nu = \infty$, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium. The equilibrium taxes are:

$$
t^N = \delta \left[ \frac{1}{3} + \left( \frac{2}{3} \right) \theta \right] \tag{3.6}
$$
\end{proposition}

\textsuperscript{21} Strictly, $t(T)$ is multi-valued at the jump point $T = \delta \sqrt{\theta}$.

\textsuperscript{22} There is an interesting contrast here with the model of Mintz and Tulkens (1986), in which each country's best response correspondence must have at least one 'downward jump' (Proposition 5, p.150).
\[ T^n = \delta \left[ \frac{2}{3} + \left( \frac{1}{3} \theta \right) \right]. \] (3.7)

**Proof:** We first show that there cannot exist a Nash equilibrium with \( t > T. \) From (3.5), the large country will set \( T \) strictly below \( t \) only if \( t > \delta / \theta, \) in which case

\[ T = \frac{1}{2} \left[ (\delta / \theta) + t \right], \] (3.8)

whilst from (3.3)

\[ t = \frac{1}{2} (\delta + T) \] (3.9)

whenever the home country finds it optimal to set a higher tax than the foreign. Substituting (3.8) in (3.9) and using \( \theta \leq 1 \) gives

\[ t = \left( \frac{\delta}{\theta} \right) \left( \frac{1 + 2\theta}{3} \right) \leq \frac{\delta}{\theta}, \]

contradicting the condition for the foreign country to wish to under-cut.

Consider then the possibility that \( t < T \) in equilibrium. From (3.3), \( t(T) < t \) for some \( t \in t(T) \) iff \( T \geq \delta \sqrt{\theta}, \) in which case

\[ t = \frac{1}{2} (\delta \theta + T). \] (3.10)

From (3.5), \( T(t) > t \) iff \( t < \delta, \) in which case

\[ T = \frac{1}{2} (\delta + t). \] (3.11)

Solving (3.10)-(3.11) gives the tax rates in (3.6)-(3.7). Since \( 2+ \theta - 3\sqrt{\theta} = (1-\sqrt{\theta})(2-\sqrt{\theta}) \geq 0, \) the condition \( T^n \geq \delta \sqrt{\theta} \) for (3.10) is satisfied. And so long as \( \theta < 1 \) (3.6) implies that also \( t^n \leq \delta, \) as required for (3.11).

Finally, it is straightforward to show from (3.3) and (3.5) that an equilibrium with \( t = T \) exists iff \( \theta = 1, \) and that the common tax rate is then \( \delta; \) which is as in (3.6)-(3.7).

We now dispense with the assumption of infinite reservation prices. Define \( v^- = \min[v, V], \ v^+ = \max[v, V] \) and introduce:

**Assumption A1:** \( \delta < v^- \)

**Assumption A2:** \( v^+ \leq 2v^- \)

Then:
PROPOSITION 2: For any reservation prices satisfying A1 and A2, \( \{t^N, t^M\} \) is the unique Nash equilibrium.

Proof: See Appendix.

Assumption A1 means that if the good were to be given away free in one country then all those in the other country would derive positive surplus by travelling to the border to collect it. This simply ensures that \( t^N \) is below \( v \) and \( T^N \) below\(^{23} \) \( V \); if this were not the case, the equilibrium of Proposition 1 would clearly become problematic. Assumption A2 requires that reservation prices in the two countries not be too dissimilar. It ensures that it is in neither country's interest to price its own citizens out of the domestic market in order to extract more revenue from foreigners. Suppose for instance\(^ {24} \) that \( v \) is very slightly below \( V \) and \( T = \omega \). Raising \( t \) from \( v \) to just below \( V \) then causes a discontinuous loss in revenue from home citizens but, at best, only a small revenue gain from cross-shoppers. In what follows we assume both A1 and A2 to be satisfied.

4. Properties of the Nash equilibrium

The most striking feature of the Nash equilibrium is the asymmetry stemming from the difference in size between the two countries. From (3.6)-(3.7)

\[
T^N - t^N = \frac{1}{2} \delta (1-\theta),
\]

and hence:

PROPOSITION 3: In equilibrium the small country strictly undercuts the large.

The intuition is straightforward. Maximising the revenue from a commodity tax requires a tax rate (in ad valorem form) equal to the reciprocal of the elasticity of demand. In the model used here, this elasticity comes only from cross-border shopping. Starting then from a position in which \( t = T \),

\(^{23}\) Taking the inequality in A1 to be strict merely removes the need for some dull qualifications in stating results.

\(^{24}\) The more general argument is in Lemma 4 of the Appendix.
the increase in demand that either government expects to induce by cutting its tax rate depends on the size of the other country. Thus it is the smaller country that perceives the higher elasticity, and which consequently undercuts. This result seems likely to extend to models more general than that used here. It captures what seems in practice to be a common characteristic of tax havens: their smallness.

What of tax revenues in the two countries? Using (3.6)-(3.7) in (3.2b) and the foreign analogue of (3.2a) one finds, in obvious notation, that

\[ r^N = \delta H \left( \frac{1+2\theta}{3} \right)^2 \]

\[ R^N = \delta H \left( \frac{2+\theta}{3} \right)^2 . \]

Consider first the comparison between the Nash equilibrium with an open border and the closed border solution (2.3). The large country is clearly worse off: some of its citizens now cross-shop, and those who do not pay (by (3.7) and A1) less than \( V \). The impact of opening the border on the small country is less obvious: it loses revenue as a result of the implicit restriction on its ability to extract surplus from its own citizens, but in equilibrium gains revenue from cross-shoppers. Part (b) of the following shows that the latter effect will dominate, and the small county consequently benefit from opening the border, iff the differential in size is sufficiently great. Moving from the closed border solution, in which all surplus is extracted, can clearly never increase the sum of revenues in the two countries; part (c) shows that it will strictly reduce collective revenues:

**PROPOSITION 4:** Moving from the closer border solution to the Nash equilibrium with an open border:

(a) Strictly reduces revenue in the larger country;

(b) Increases revenue in the small country iff \( \theta \) is below some \( \theta^* \in (0,1) \)

(c) Strictly reduces global revenue.

**Proof:** Parts (a) and (c) are straightforward, and so omitted. For (b) note from (4.2) that the gain to the small country in moving to the Nash equilibrium, regarded as a function of \( \theta \), is
\[ f(\theta) = r^N - vh = H\left( \delta \left( \frac{1+2\theta}{3} \right)^2 - v\theta \right). \] (4.4)

The existence of \( \theta^* \) with the property claimed then follows on noting that \( f(\theta) \) is strictly convex with \( f(0) > 0 \) and, by assumption A1, \( f(1) = H(\delta-v) < 0 \).

Note in particular that if \( \theta = 1 \), so that the Nash equilibrium is symmetric,\(^25\) part (c) implies that opening the border is Pareto-worsening: both countries lose revenue.

What of relative tax revenues in the Nash equilibrium? The smaller country charges a lower tax rate, but since it gains revenue from cross-border shopping it is not clear that this will necessarily translate into a lower level of tax revenue. From (4.2)-(4.3), however, one finds that it does:
\[ R^N - r^N = \delta H(1-\theta^2)/3 \geq 0. \]
For per capita revenues, in contrast,
\[ \frac{R^N}{n} - \frac{r^N}{n} = \frac{\delta}{3} \frac{(1-\theta^2)}{n} \leq 0, \] (4.5)
and thus:

**PROPOSITION 5:** At the Nash equilibrium, tax revenue is higher in the large country than in the small. Per capita revenue, however, is greatest in the small country.

In equilibrium, the tax haven country thus receives more than its pro rata share of global tax revenues.

Turning to comparative statics, the role played by the 'transport cost' parameter \( \delta \) is remarkable in two respects:

**PROPOSITION 6:** Within the range of \( \delta \) satisfying A1:

(a) The amount of cross-border shopping in the Nash equilibrium is independent of transport costs;

(b) An increase in transport costs is strictly Pareto-improving.

---

\(^25\) There is here another contrast with Mintz and Tulkens (1986): in the model used there no symmetric equilibrium exists when the two countries are identical.
Proof: From the discussion in Section 2, the extent of cross-border shopping in the Nash equilibrium is \((T^N-t^N)/\delta\); part (a) then follows from (4.1). Part (b) is immediate from (4.2)-(4.3).

Both parts of Proposition 6, counter-intuitive at first blush, emphasise the centrality of strategic responses in shaping the non-cooperative outcome. For part (a), one might have expected an increase in transport costs to reduce the extent of cross-border shopping. But such an increase enables the large country to raise its tax rate with less fear of losing sales to the other jurisdiction; and this increase in \(T\) in turn enables the smaller country to raise its tax rate without driving trade back over the border. In the present simple model, best responses are such that the net effect is to leave cross-border shopping entirely unaffected. For part (b), it is clear enough that the large country would benefit from an increase in \(\delta\), since the open border leads to a very tangible erosion of its tax base. It is much less obvious, however, that the same is also true of the small country, which gains revenue from cross-border shopping. Indeed we have seen that simply closing the border may reduce the small country's tax revenue. But for the reason just given an increase in transport costs should not be thought of as like moving some way towards a world in which the border is closed. By encouraging the large country to raise its tax rate, it enables the small country to raise its tax rate too without losing custom; and thus it will find its revenue increased.

While the sharpness of Proposition 6 may not survive in more general models, the lesson is simple and clear: once account is taken of strategic responses in tax-setting, increasing transport costs may have relatively little effect on the extent of cross-border shopping, and consequently even tax haven countries that apparently gain from cross-shopping may benefit from measures that make it more costly.

The significance of relative size also proves striking. Holding global population \(h+H\) constant, differentiation of (4.2)-(4.3) shows that starting from any position in which \(\theta < 1\) a small increase in \(\theta\) leads to higher tax revenue in both countries.\(^\text{26}\) In this sense:

\(^{26}\) For \(\theta > 1/2\), a reduction in dispersion of this kind can also be shown to
PROPOSITION 7: Reducing the disparity between the sizes of the two countries is strictly Pareto improving.

The large country would rather be somewhat smaller, for instance, because although this would reduce the size of its 'captive' domestic market the under-cutting by its neighbour would become sufficiently less aggressive to more than compensate. For the small country, exactly the reverse reasoning applies: though it gains from cross-border shopping, it would rather have a larger domestic market to exploit. The implication is striking. Opening the borders may or may not be to the smaller country's advantage. Once the border is open, however, the asymmetry between the sizes of the two countries is in itself unambiguously a source of harm to both.

The last and central property of the Nash equilibrium is its inefficiency. This is characterised in:

PROPOSITION 8: For θ < 1, a 'small' multilateral reform \( dt, dT \) from the Nash equilibrium is strictly Pareto improving iff \( dt > 0 \) and \( dT > 0 \).

**Proof:** With \( t^N < T^N \), both revenue functions are differentiable at the Nash equilibrium. The effect on home revenue of an arbitrary small reform is thus

\[
\frac{dr}{dt} = r_t(t^N,T^N)dt + r_T(t^N,T^N)dT, \tag{4.6}
\]

the subscripts denoting differentiation. Since \( t^N = t(T^N) \),

\[
r_t(t^N,T^N) = 0. \tag{4.7}
\]

In the neighbourhood of \( \{t^N, T^N\} \), revenue in the home country is given by \( (3.2b) \), and hence

\[
r_T(t^N,T^N) = t^N H/\delta. \tag{4.8}
\]

Combining (4.6)-(4.8), the effect on home revenue of a small multilateral reform from the Nash equilibrium is \( dr = (t^N H/\delta) dT \), and so has the same sign as \( dT \). The argument for the foreign country is analogous, remembering that revenue there is given locally by the analogue of (3.2a).

---

increase per capita revenue in both countries.
Unrestricted tax competition thus leads to tax rates that are unambiguously too low.\textsuperscript{27} The reason is obvious: when choosing its tax rate, each country ignores the beneficial effect that raising it would have on the revenues of the other country by pushing cross-border trade in its direction.

This inefficiency creates scope for mutually advantageous cooperation. For 'small' tax changes from asymmetric equilibria, Proposition 8 provides a complete characterisation of mutually advantageous coordinated domestic reforms. The practical policy issues, however, are ones in which reform is discrete rather than marginal: harmonization of excises on cigarettes all the way to a common rate, for instance, rather than a little way in that general direction. For such reforms one loses the analytical simplicity that (4.7) brings for local reforms around the non-cooperative equilibrium. The simplicity of our model, however, makes it well-suited to the global analysis required for non-marginal reforms of the kind in prospect.

5. Policies of tax coordination

We consider in turn the two strategies around which particular policy interest is currently focussed: harmonization, and the imposition of minimum rate. The benchmark is in each case the non-cooperative equilibrium discussed above. For simplicity, we also assume throughout this section that $v = V = \omega$, the qualifications that relaxing this requires being, for the most part, obvious.

5.1 Tax harmonisation

Suppose the two countries set a common tax rate, $\tau$. This eliminates cross-border shopping, giving revenues of

$$ r^\tau = r_h \quad ; \quad R^\tau = \tau H. \quad (5.1) $$

Since revenue in each country is strictly increasing in $\tau$, there exists for each of them a critical level of the harmonized rate such that their revenue exceeds that in the Nash equilibrium iff $\tau$ exceeds that level. In practice,

\textsuperscript{27}This is analogous to a result of de Crombrugghe and Tulkens (1990) for the model of Mintz and Tulkens (1986).
harmonization proposals typically envisage convergence at or around a common rate calculated as some kind of weighted average of the initial tax rates.\footnote{This is explicit, for instance, in the European Commission's 1987 proposals.} Particular importance thus attaches to the position of these critical levels relative to the tax rates of the non-cooperative equilibrium, and it is on this that we focus.

Consider first the small country. If harmonization were at the higher of the Nash taxes its revenue would be

\[ r^\tau = r(T^N, T^N) < r(t(T^N), T^N) = r(t^N, T^N) = r^N, \quad (5.2) \]

(the strict inequality being from uniqueness of the best response to \( T^N \): relative to the non-cooperative equilibrium, revenue in the small country would fall. Since \( r^\tau \) is strictly increasing in \( \tau \) we thus have an extremely sharp result:

**Proposition 9**: Harmonisation to any \( \tau \) between the Nash equilibrium tax rates is certain to harm the small country.

For the large country on the other hand, harmonization to the higher of the non-cooperative tax rates would clearly be beneficial: it would gain revenue from those of its residents who cross-shop in the Nash equilibrium without losing any from those who shop domestically. By an argument analogous to that in (5.2), harmonization to the lower of the Nash taxes, in contrast, would reduce revenue in the large country below its level in the Nash equilibrium. Hence:

**Proposition 10**: There exists \( \hat{\tau} \in (t^N, T^N) \) such that the large country benefits from harmonization to \( \tau \) iff \( \tau > \hat{\tau} \).

Both countries thus have cause to fear harmonization. When the point of convergence is calculated as some weighted average of the non-cooperative tax rates, the small country is bound to lose; if sufficiently high weight is attached to the lower of the Nash taxes, so too will the large.
The thrust of Propositions 9 and 10, it should be emphasised, is in exactly the opposite direction to much of the recent literature on harmonization. In particular, it is shown in Keen (1989) that when the destination principle applies harmonization\textsuperscript{29} from the non-cooperative equilibrium increases welfare in both countries. Though the two models are very different - particularly in the criterion used to evaluate reforms - this contrast points to the centrality of cross-border shopping in evaluating practical proposals for tax coordination: measures that seem attractive when the destination principle is enforced may well cease to be so when it is not.\textsuperscript{30}

5.2 A minimum tax rate

Suppose instead that some lower bound $\mu$ is imposed on the tax rate that a country may choose. The interesting case is that in which this minimum lies between the non-cooperative tax rates, and we therefore take it that

$$ t^N < \mu < T^N. \quad (5.3) $$

The first task is to characterise the new non-cooperative equilibrium, illustrated in Figure 4. Consider then the impact of the minimum tax constraint on the best response functions of the two countries. Two simple observations are helpful. First, attention can of course be restricted to best responses to tax rates no less than $\mu$. Second, wherever the best response in the absence of the constraint is to set a tax no less than $\mu$ the best response function will be unaffected. The implications of the minimum tax for the best response function of the large country are then straightforward. Recalling (3.5), the best response function of the large country in the unconstrained case, $T(t)$, is strictly increasing. Then using (5.3)

\textsuperscript{29} To an appropriately weighted average of initial tax rates.

\textsuperscript{30} Prospects are less gloomy in terms of joint revenue: it can be shown that there exists $T$ between the Nash rates such that harmonization to any rate at or above $T$ increases total revenue across the two countries. This is more in keeping with the corresponding results for the case in which the destination principle is maintained: whatever the starting point of reform, harmonisation to an appropriately weighted average of initial tax rates is then potentially Pareto-improving (Keen (1987), Turunen-Red and Woodland (1990)).
\( T(t) \geq T(\mu) > T(t^H) = T^H > \mu, \quad \forall t \geq \mu \) (5.4)

and so, by the preceding observations, the only effect of the minimum tax constraint is to remove the segment corresponding to \( t < \mu \).

Matters are more complex for the small country. Recall Figure 3 for the unconstrained case, and imagine increasing \( T \) from a low level. When the jump point at \( T = \delta \sqrt{\theta} \) is reached, the home country would like to switch to the lower segment of its best response function. But the tax rate it would wish to charge, being lower than \( t^H \), violates the minimum tax constraint. So it is now optimal for the home country to continue over-cutting the large, extending the upper segment of the best response function. As \( T \) continues to increase, however, there will come a point at which under-cutting becomes desirable even though it can go no lower than \( \mu \). This point will come before the \( T \) is reached at which the home country would have wished to set a tax of \( \mu \) even in the absence of the constraint. Intuitively, if the tax that the home country would have wished to set is only just below the minimum then it will be better to charge that minimum than to switch discontinuously to over-cutting; somewhat more formally, if it were not optimal to switch before the point at which \( \mu \) is the best unconstrained response then the initial best response function would have had to have been discontinuous there too. Geometrically, the effect of the minimum tax constraint on the best response function of the small country is thus to move the jump point to the right and rotate the left part of the lower segment clockwise to give a portion horizontal at \( \mu \); see Figure 4.

With the 'hole' in the small country's best response function moving to the right and that of the larger country being unchanged in the relevant region, the existence of a Nash equilibrium is now problematic. If however an equilibrium does exist\(^{31}\) then it must be at a point like \( E^m \) in Figure 4. More precisely:

**PROPOSITION 11:** In the presence of a minimum tax constraint as in (5.3), there can be no more than one Nash equilibrium. Taxes at such an equilibrium are:

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\(^{31}\) The conditions which ensure this are not especially enlightening.
\[ t^m = \mu \]  
\[ T^m = \frac{1}{2}(\delta + \mu) \] (5.5) (5.6)

**Proof:** Note first that at least one of the countries must set its tax exactly at \( \mu \) in equilibrium; otherwise, by the second of the observations above, the equilibrium would be at an intersection of the best response correspondences unrestricted by the minimum tax condition; and this, from the uniqueness aspect of Proposition 1, is ruled out by (5.3).

Since \( t^m \geq \mu \) by the minimum tax constraint, (5.4) implies that \( T^m > \mu \). So it must be that \( t^m = \mu \). Recalling that in the relevant range the large country's reaction function is as in (3.5), and noting from (5.3) and (3.7) that \( \mu < \delta \), \( T^m \) must then be as in (5.6).

In equilibrium the small country thus sets exactly the minimum permissible, and continues to undercut the large.

Consider then the impact of the minimum tax constraint on the tax revenues of the two countries, the comparison again being with the outcome under unrestricted tax competition. Both now set higher tax rates. The increase is greater for the small country, however, than it is for the large: this is clear from Figure 4, and easy to check. Thus the volume of cross-border shopping falls. Revenue will therefore certainly increase in the large country, but once again the effect on the small country is unclear: revenue is gained on sales to its own residents but lost through diminished cross-shopping. The following shows, however, that the first of these effects dominates, so that the small country will also gain:

**Proposition 12:** Suppose \( \theta < 1 \), so that the two countries set different tax rates in the unrestricted Nash equilibrium. Then imposing as a minimum any tax that lies between those rates (and for which there exists a Nash equilibrium) is strictly Pareto improving.

**Proof:** The argument for the large country is straightforward, so we deal only with the small. Using (5.5)–(5.6) in (3.2b), home revenue in the restricted Nash equilibrium, regarded as a function of \( \mu \), can be written as

\[ r^m(\mu) = \frac{(\delta(1+2\theta)\mu - \mu^2)H/2\delta}{\delta} \] (5.7)
This is strictly concave in \( \mu \), and so since \( \mu \) lies between the two Nash taxes
\[
 r^m(\mu) > \min[r^m(t^N), r^m(T^N)] .
\] (5.8)

Recalling (4.2) it is straightforward to show that \( r^m(t^N) = r^N \): imposing the lower of the Nash taxes as a minimum leaves the equilibrium – and hence also tax revenues – undisturbed. One also finds that \( r^m(t^N) - r^N = \theta(1-\theta) \delta H/6 > 0 \), and the conclusion then follows from (5.8).

This is a remarkably strong result. Comparing it with Propositions 9 and 10, in particular, establishes a clear dominance of the minimum tax strategy over that of harmonization. Whereas harmonising to any tax rate intermediate to those of the unrestricted Nash equilibrium is certain to harm the small country and may also harm the large, imposing that same rate as a minimum will be to the benefit of both.

Note though that higher minimum tax rates do not necessarily Pareto-dominate lower ones. Revenue in the large country always increase with \( \mu \), but, from (5.7) and (3.6), that in the small decreases once \( \mu > (3/2) t^N \). Using (3.6) and (3.7), it follows that for \( \theta < .25 \) revenue in the small country will eventually begin to fall as \( \mu \) rises towards \( T^N \): if the differential in size is sufficiently great, there comes a point at which the loss of cross-border trade dominates the increased receipts from purchases by residents. While revenue in the small country cannot fall below its level under unrestricted tax competition, there may nevertheless be a conflict of interest between the two countries in the choice of the minimum. This in turn is a reminder that the minimum tax strategy, despite its dominance over harmonization, is unlikely to achieve a fully optimal outcome.

6. Optimal taxation in the presence of cross-border shopping

When the border is closed, the cooperative and non-cooperative solutions to the governments’ optimisation problems coincide: each sets its tax at the reservation price of its own residents. Having examined the effects of opening the border on the non-cooperative outcome and of some particular measures of coordination, we consider now its implications for cooperative
tax design; the nature, that is, of optimal coordination.

Two criteria of optimality are of particular interest. The first is Pareto efficiency, maximising the revenue of one country conditional on securing some given level of revenue for the other. This can be shown to require that at least one country tax exactly at its own residents' reservation price, but beyond that leads to few particularly instructive insights. We therefore focus on a second and stronger criterion, that of joint revenue maximisation. From this perspective the opening of the border is unambiguously damaging: when it is closed and taxes set as in (2.3), joint revenue is at the upper bound imposed by reservation prices. Except when reservation prices happen to be the same in the two countries, opening the border whilst retaining taxes at these levels must lead to a dilution of revenue through cross-border shopping. The problem then is to find the pattern of tax rates that maximises joint revenue subject to the constraint imposed by consumers' freedom to cross-shop.

To do this we now drop the convention that $\theta \leq 1$ and instead label countries so that $V \geq v$. Denoting an optimal tax structure by $(t^*_o, T^*_o)$, the subscript indicating the open border, the optimal tax structure is then characterised in:

**PROPOSITION 13:** Joint revenue maximisation requires that the tax structure be of one of the following forms:

- **TYPE C:** $t^*_o = v$ and $T^*_o = V$;
- **TYPE I:** $t^*_o = v$ and $T^*_o = v + \delta/2$;
- **TYPE H:** $t^*_o = T^*_o = V$.

It is of type C iff

$$V \leq \min\{\delta/2 + v, v + \sqrt{\delta}\theta\} ,$$  

(6.1)

of type H iff

$$V \geq \max\{\delta/4 + (1+\theta)v, v+\sqrt{\delta}\theta\} ,$$  

(6.2)

---

32 Belgium and Luxembourg, interestingly, do indeed have a revenue-sharing agreement covering most indirect taxes other than VAT.

33 In this case the optimal $t$ is not unique, since with $T = V$ any $t \geq V$ will lead to the same equilibrium. For clarity, we eliminate this redundancy in stating the result.
and of type I otherwise.

**Proof:** See Appendix.

There are thus only three possibilities. The first, a type C optimum, is to retain taxes at exactly the levels that are optimal when the border is closed: the best response to the cross-border shopping that opening the border induces may be not to respond at all. The second, type I, is to continue to charge the reservation price in the low valuation country but reduce the tax in the high valuation country to a level intermediate between the two reservation prices: cross-border shopping is diminished, but not eliminated. The third, type H, is to harmonise at the higher of the reservation prices: squeezing the low valuation consumers out of purchasing altogether in order to safeguard revenue from the high valuation.

The intuition behind this characterisation of the optimum can be brought out from Figure 5. Drawn conditionally on δ and θ, this shows the regions in (v,V) space corresponding to the three types of optimum. Consider then some particular v and imagine increasing V from V = v. With taxes retained at their closed border levels, a proportion (V-v)/δ of high valuation consumers will shop in the low tax country. The revenue cost of this, however, is initially less than the first-order loss of revenue that would result from reducing T in order to stem the flow of cross-shopping. It thus remains optimal to set taxes at their closed border levels: the Type C optimum. The implications of further increases in V depend on the level of vθ, which can be thought of as measuring the taxable capacity of the low valuation country.

If vθ > δ/4 there comes a point at which the extent of cross-border shopping is so great that it becomes optimal to set T < V, foregoing some revenue from those foreign consumers who shop domestically in order to switch purchases by some of the others back to the high tax country. At this point - which arrives when exactly half of the high valuation consumers shop abroad - the optimum becomes that of Type I. As V continues to increase the optimal tax rates remain for some while entirely unchanged, and hence so too

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34 Note that A1 and A2 ensure (V-v)/δ < 1.
does the extent of cross-border shopping: remarkably, the level to which it is optimal to lower $T$ in response to the dilution of revenue through cross-border shopping is independent of $V$. For $V$ sufficiently large, however, the loss of revenue implicit in leaving high valuation consumers with strictly positive surplus outweighs the revenue gained from low valuation consumers by keeping the tax rate they face sufficiently low that they continue to purchase. The optimum then becomes that of Type $H$: both $t$ and $T$ are raised discontinuously to $V$ in order to extract the maximum from the high valuation consumers.

The story is rather different if the taxable capacity of the low valuation country is also low, in the sense that $v \theta \leq \delta/4$. In this case it is easily seen from (6.1)-(6.2) that the optimum cannot be of Type $I$. Instead it is always optimal to set $T = V$: responding to cross-border shopping, if at all, not by foregoing some revenue on high valuation consumers who shop domestically but by foregoing all revenue on low valuation consumers.

The role of the transport cost parameter $\delta$ in determining the optimal tax structure can also be seen from Figure 5. As $\delta \to 0$ the region corresponding to a Type $C$ optimum vanishes. In the limit, the optimal structure is thus one in which taxes are harmonised, either at the higher of the reservation prices or (recalling that $T = v + \delta/2$ in a Type $I$ optimum) at the lower. Which of these it will be depends on the relative sizes and reservation prices of the two countries: harmonization will optimally be at the lower of the reservation prices iff the relative size of the low valuation country exceeds $(V-v)/v$, the proportion by which the lower reservation price falls short of the higher.

7. Conclusion

Consider again the questions raised at the outset. Which kinds of countries choose to become tax havens? Here we have focused on the role of size, showing that it introduces a fundamental asymmetry into the best response patterns of small and large countries: the model has a unique non-cooperative equilibrium in which the smaller country charges a lower tax than the large (Proposition 2). Even more strikingly, differences in size
have been seen to exacerbate the inefficiencies of non-cooperative behaviour. Tax competition between countries identical in size leads to an inefficient outcome. But when countries differ in size the outcome is even worse: the small country would prefer to be rather larger, and the larger to be rather smaller (Proposition 7).

What is the likely pattern of taxation in a border-free Europe of 1992 if tax competition is unrestricted? The smaller country not only charges a lower tax rate than does the large in our non-cooperative equilibrium, it also ends up with less tax revenue. It receives, however, a disproportionately large share of collective tax revenue: per capita expenditure on public goods is higher in the tax haven country (Proposition 5). Opening the borders - more precisely, moving from a situation in which the destination principle is enforced to one in which it is not - leads to a loss of revenue in the large country. More surprisingly, the same may also be true of the small country, despite the revenue it gains from cross-border shopping (Proposition 4).

Are there mutually advantageous forms of coordination? Simple harmonization of the kind often proposed has emerged in a very unfavourable light: even if the common rate adopted is that which the large country sets in the non-cooperative equilibrium, the revenue gained from its own residents' purchases is insufficient to compensate the smaller country for the loss of cross-border trade (Proposition 9). The imposition of a minimum tax rate, in contrast, benefits both countries: the strategic response of the large country is such as to ensure that sufficient cross-border shopping remains for the small country also to gain (Proposition 12). In the context of US-Mexico free trade, for example, the negotiation of lower bounds on key tax rates may prove mutually advantageous.

How does increased international mobility affect optimal domestic tax structures? In terms of collective optimality, the answer could well be: not at all (Proposition 13). The first order revenue loss incurred if the large country cuts its domestic tax rate in order to stem the flow of cross-border trade may outweigh the dilution of collective revenue that such trade implies.
The direct applicability of these and our other results is naturally limited by the special structure of the model. They are nevertheless suggestive. They emphasise, in particular, the importance of recognising the strategic context in which measures of coordination must be assessed. Ignoring these can lead to seriously misleading conclusions. One example of this is the minimum tax result referred to above. Another is the finding that making cross-border shopping more difficult (without going so far as to eliminate it) may be to the benefit of the 'tax haven' country (Proposition 6): the consequent increase in taxation in the larger country enables the smaller to increase its own tax rate without diminishing the volume of cross-border trade. Simple models of the kind developed here cannot provide precise recommendations for the design of tax cooperation and free trade agreements. Our purpose has rather been to sharpen the intuition needed for these difficult and increasingly pressing tasks.
APPENDIX

Derivation of (3.3)-(3.4). This proceeds in three steps. The first is to find the optimal $t$ and associated tax revenue when the home country is artificially constrained to charge at least as high a tax rate as the foreign government; to consider, that is, the problem

\[
\max_t r(t, T) \text{ subject to } t \geq T,
\]

This gives

\[
t^1(T) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{1}{2}(\delta + T) & ; \ T \leq \delta \\
T & ; \ T \geq \delta
\end{cases} \quad (A.1a)
\]

and maximised revenue

\[
r[t^1(T), T] = \begin{cases} 
\left( \frac{H}{\delta} \right) \left( \frac{T + \delta}{2} \right)^2 & ; \ T \leq \delta \\
hT & ; \ T \geq \delta
\end{cases} \quad (A.2a)
\]

The second is to repeat the exercise with the home government instead constrained to under-cut the foreign. Solving

\[
\max_t r(t, T) \text{ subject to } t \leq T
\]

one finds that in this case

\[
t^2(T) = \begin{cases} 
T & ; \ T \leq \delta \theta \\
\frac{1}{2}(\delta \theta + T) & ; \ T \geq \delta \theta
\end{cases} \quad (A.3a)
\]

\[
r[t^2(T), T] = \begin{cases} 
hT & ; \ T \leq \delta \theta \\
\left( \frac{H}{\delta} \right) \left( \delta \theta + T \right)^2 & ; \ T \geq \delta \theta
\end{cases} \quad (A.4a)
\]

The final step is to compare for all $T$ the maximised revenues under these constrained problems in order to identify the optimum for the unconstrained one. Partitioning the range of $T$, there are four possibilities to consider:

(a) For $T \leq \min[\delta, \delta \theta]$, comparing (A.2a) and (A.4a) gives, after some rearrangement (and in obvious notation)

\[
r^1 - r^2 = h(T - \delta)^2/\delta \theta \geq 0
\]

and so, from (A.1a), $t(T) = \frac{1}{2}(\delta + T)$.

(b) For $T \geq \max[\delta, \delta \theta]$, (A.2b) and (A.4b) give
\[ r^1 - r^2 = -H(\delta \theta - T)^2 / \delta \theta \leq 0 \]

and so, from (A.3b), \( t(T) = \frac{1}{2} (\delta \theta + T) \).

(c) If \( \theta \geq 1 \) then for \( T \in [\delta \theta, \delta \theta] \) one finds from (A.2b) and (A.4a) that \( r^1 = r^2 \), and hence \( t(T) = T \).

(d) If \( \theta \leq 1 \) then for \( T \in [\delta \theta, \delta \theta] \) one has from (A.2a) and (A.4b) that

\[ r^1 - r^2 = H(1-\theta)(\theta \delta^2 - T^2) / \delta \theta \]

and so from (A.1a) and (A.3b)

\[
\begin{cases} 
\frac{1}{2} (\delta + T) & ; \delta \theta \leq T \leq \delta \sqrt{\theta} \\
\frac{1}{2} (\delta \theta + T) & ; \delta \sqrt{\theta} \leq T \leq \delta .
\end{cases}
\]

Piecing together (a)-(d) gives (3.3)-(3.4).

Proof of Proposition 2: This involves a series of lemmas, which we state and prove from the perspective of the home country. They make no use, however, of the labelling \( \theta \leq 1 \) in Sections 3-5 of the text, so exact analogues apply to the foreign country.

Denote by \( r^H(t,T) \) and \( t^H(T) \) respectively the home country's revenue function and best response correspondence conditional on some particular pair of finite reservation prices: for brevity, we omit these as arguments. Then:

Lemma 1: \( r^H(t,T) \leq r(t,T) \), with equality if \( t \leq v \) and \( T \leq V \).

Proof: The weak inequality is obvious: introducing finite reservation prices cannot increase revenue. That the equality holds if each country's tax is below the reservation price of its own residents follows on noting that each consumer's purchase decision will then be exactly as if reservation prices were infinite: cross-shoppers will be unaffected, since if the price in their own country is below their reservation price then so must be the (lower) effective price they face in shopping abroad.

Lemma 2: If \( t(T) \leq v \) and \( T \leq V \) then \( t^H(T) = t(T) \).

Proof: Immediate from Lemma 1.

Lemma 3: \( r^H[t^H(T), t] > 0, \forall T \geq 0 \).
Proof: The home country can always secure strictly positive revenue by setting \( t \in (0, \min\{v, T+\delta\}) \).

Lemma 4: If A2 holds \((v^+ \leq 2v^-)\) then \( t^V(T) \leq v, \forall T \leq V \).

Proof: Suppose that for some \( T' \leq V, t' = t^V(T') > v \). All home revenue must then come from cross-shoppers. There are then two possibilities to consider. The first is that \( t' \geq T' \). But then home revenue is zero, so by Lemma 3 \( t' \) cannot be a best response. If \( t' < T' \), home revenue in a neighbourhood around \( t' \) is

\[
r^V(t, T') = th\left(\frac{T' - t}{\delta}\right),
\]

(A.5)
differentiation of which gives

\[
r^V(t', T') = H(T' - 2t')/\delta < H(v^+ - 2v^-)/\delta \leq 0,
\]

the first inequality being from \( T' \leq V \leq v^+ \) and \( t' > v \geq v^- \). Thus \( t' \) cannot be a best response to \( T' \).

Lemma 5: If A2 holds then \( t^V(T) \leq t(T), \forall T \leq V \).

Proof: Immediate from Lemmas 2 and 4.

Lemma 6: If A2 holds then in any Nash equilibrium \( (t', T') \), \( t' \leq v \) and \( T' \leq V \).

Proof: Suppose \( t' = t^V(T') > v \). Then \( T' > V \) (by Lemma 4) and so \( T' < t' \) (by Lemma 3). But then \( r^V(t', T') = 0 \), contradicting Lemma 3.

Consider then the structure of \( t^V(T) \). From (3.3), \( t(T) < \delta \) iff \( T < \delta(2-\theta) \). By A1, \( t(T) < v \) throughout this range. By Lemma 6, attention can be restricted to \( T \leq V \), and so by Lemma 2 \( t^V(T) = t(T) \) in (the relevant part of) this range. Above \( T = \delta(2-\theta) \), (3.3) gives \( t(T) < T \). Thus, using Lemma 5, for \( T \leq V \)

\[
t^V(T) = \begin{cases} 
g_1(T) = t(T) \leq \delta & ; T \leq \delta(2-\theta) 
g_2(T) \leq t(T) < T & ; T > \delta(2-\theta)
\end{cases}
\]

(A.6)

Arguing similarly for the large country gives
\[ T^U(t) = \begin{cases} 
G_1(t) = T(t) \leq \delta & ; \ t \leq \delta \\
G_2(t) \leq T(t) \leq t & ; \ t > \delta 
\end{cases} \]

for \( t \leq v \). Since \( t^N \leq \delta(2 \cdot \theta) \) and \( t^N \leq \delta \), Proposition 1 implies that \( g_1 \) and \( G_1 \) intersect exactly once, at the rates of (3.6)-(3.7). By A1, \( \{t^N, t^N\} \) thus remains an equilibrium. The proof is completed by precluding the only other kinds of equilibria permitted by (A.6) and (A.7): \( g_1 \) and \( G_2 \) cannot intersect since \( t \leq \delta \) on the former but \( t > \delta \) on the latter; \( g_2 \) and \( G_1 \) cannot intersect because \( T > \delta \) on the former but \( T \leq \delta \) on the latter; \( g_2 \) and \( G_2 \) cannot intersect because \( t < T \) on the former but \( t \geq T \) on the latter.

QED

Proof of Proposition 13: If \( v = V \) then it is immediate that the optimum is of Type C. Consider then the case in which \( V > v \). That the optimum must of one of the forms in the Proposition follows from the next three lemmas:

Lemma 7: \( t^N \geq v \).

Proof: Suppose that \( t < v \), and consider the two possibilities:

(i) If \( T \leq t \) then for any \( \varepsilon \in (0, v-t) \) the reform \( dt = dT = \varepsilon \) would have no effect on any consumer's purchase decision: none would cease to purchase the good, since prices remain below both reservation prices (including the effective prices faced by cross-shoppers), and no consumer would switch the jurisdiction of their purchase (since this choice depends only on the difference \( t-T \)). The reform thus increases the tax that each consumer pays, and hence so too total tax revenue.

(ii) If \( T > t \) no home consumer shops abroad. If moreover \( V > T \) then for \( \varepsilon \) small enough a reform of the kind in part (1) must again increase revenue. This leaves only the possibility that \( T = V \). Home revenue is then as in (3.2b) and foreign as in the analogue of (3.2b), and hence total revenue is

\[ r + R = th + VH - \left( \frac{H}{\delta} \right) (V - t)^2 \]

which, since \( t < V \), is strictly increasing in \( t \).

Lemma 8: If \( t^* > v \) then \( t^* \geq T^* = V \)
Proof: With $t^* > v$ home consumers buy, if at all, in the foreign country. Then it is straightforward to show that $T^* \leq V$: otherwise revenue would be zero (if $t^* \geq V$) or (if $t^* < V$) lower than it would be at $t = T = V$. That $t^*_o \geq T^*_o$ follows on noting that with $T > t > v$ collective revenue would be increased by raising $t$: since there are no purchases by home consumers, this would simply extract more from foreign cross-shoppers.

With $t^*_o \geq T^*_o$ there remain two possibilities. The first is that $T^*_o \leq v$. Collective revenue is then no greater than $v(h+H)$; but more than this can be raised by setting $t = v$ and $T = t + \varepsilon$, for $\varepsilon > 0$ and sufficiently small. The second is that $T^*_o > v$. Collective revenue in such a regime is $T^*_o H$, and so is maximised by setting $t^*_o \geq T^*_o = V$.

Lemma 9: If $t^* = v$ then $T^* = \min[v + \delta/2, V]$.

Proof: Fixing $t = v$, again consider the two possibilities:

(i) With $T < t$, total revenue is

$$ r + R = vh + TH - \left(\frac{h}{\delta}\right)(v - T)^2 $$
and so is strictly increasing in $T$.

(ii) With $T \geq t$, if $T \geq V$ then revenue would be increased by setting $T = t + \varepsilon$, for small enough $\varepsilon > 0$. If $T < V$ total revenue is

$$ r + R = vh + TH - \left(\frac{H}{\delta}\right)(T - v)^2, $$
which is strictly increasing (decreasing) in $T$ for $T < (>) v + \delta/2$.

It remains to establish conditions (6.1)-(6.2). Note first that if $V = v$ then the optimality of a Type C solution is indeed implied by (6.1). Suppose then that $V > v$. Denoting total revenue at a Type I optimum by $\Sigma_I$, it is straightforward to show that

$$ \Sigma_C = [v\theta + v - (V-v)^2/\delta]H \quad \text{(6.8)} $$
$$ \Sigma_I = [v(1+\theta) + \delta/4]H \quad \text{(6.9)} $$
$$ \Sigma_H = VH \quad \text{(6.10)} $$

By the argument in part (ii) of Lemma 9, the Type C solution dominates the type I whenever $v + (\delta/2)$ exceeds $V$. Comparing $\Sigma_C$ with $\Sigma_H$ then gives condition (6.1). The optimum is of Type H iff $\Sigma_H$ exceeds both $\Sigma_I$ and $\Sigma_C$; and this, from (6.8)-(6.10), is equivalent to (6.2). QED
References


Duncan, H.T. (1988), 'Interstate cooperative efforts to enforce state sales and use taxes.' *Proceedings of the Eighty-First Annual Conference of the National Tax Association-Tax Institute of America*, 93-98.


FIG. 1: Cross-border Shopping with $t > T$

Foreign $(V,T)$  Home $(v,t)$

-1  0  $t-T$  1

\[ \delta \]

Shop in foreign  Shop in home

FIG. 2: Best Response Functions

(a) Home small ($\theta < 1$)

(b) Home large ($\theta > 1$)
FIG 3: The Nash Equilibrium

FIG 4: A Minimum Tax
FIG 5: Regions of Optimal Taxation